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The practices of organ procurement and organ donor re-
cruitment in the United States rest upon two significant but
incorrect assumptions. The first is that validly signed donor
cards have merely advisorial function; that is, that their pur-
pose is simply to communicate the supposedly nonbinding de-
sires of deceased or incompetent potential donors to serve as
sources of lifesaving organs and tissues after death. Procure-
ment personnel do not accord these documents the legal force
of wills. Hence, they invariably ask families of all potential
donors - declared and undeclared - for permission to remove
organs and tissues from deceased kin. This practice is, however,
(a) inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of nearly all
state Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts; (b) inconsistent with the
defensible claim that the majority of interests bound up with
ownership apply to the relation of a person to his or her body
during life and after death; and (c) almost unanimously judged
to be morally unacceptable by respondents in two recent em-
pirical surveys..The paper proposes an appropriate revised pro-
cedure for use by procurement staff in counseling with families
of deceased declared donors.
A second incorrect assumption lies at the heart of donor
recruitment campaigns. This is the assumption that consenting
to the posthumous removal of organs from one's own body is
an act of charity, a work of superergogation. The author argues
to the contrary that consenting to the removal and transfer of
one's own organs after death is a moral duty. The duty to con-
sent is derivative from a more general moral duty variously
called the duty of mutual aid or the duty to attempt an easy
rescue of an endangered person (or persons). So, while it is true
that every individual has first authority, i.e., paramount right
over all others, to control the posthumous disposition of his or
her own body parts after death, the author argues that this
right is overridden by the more weighty moral duty to consent
to the removal and transfer of personal organs after death.
* Chairman, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, River Falls,
Wisconsin 54022.
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This last claim has implications for a policy of fair distri-
bution of cadaveric organs under conditions of scarcity. In such
circumstances justice demands that those who have consented
to be posthumous organ providers, i.e., those who have fulfilled
the moral duty to consent, be given first priority access to the
cadaver organ pool in the event of need. Nonconsenters are to
be given second priority access. This distribution principle is
embodied in recent legislation passed by the Parliament of
Singapore - the Human Organ Transplant Act of 1986. A
variety of practical problems connected with instituting in the
United States this fair distribution policy are considered and
some solutions proposed.
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Professionals engaged in the practices of organ procurement and or-
gan donor recruitment in the United States appear to be guided by two
important but fallacious assumptions. First, the standard manner in
which procurement personnel approach families of hospitalized potential
donors indicates that such personnel view validly signed donor cards
simply as nonbinding expressions of their signers' willingness to have
usable organs removed from their bodies after death. Retrieval staff
clearly proceed on the assumption that such declarations must be vali-
dated by the families of declared donors, and that written directives by
the latter concerning the posthumous disposition of their body parts are
in principle subject to veto by declarants' survivors. Second, those in-
volved in donor recruitment typically characterize a person's consent to
the posthumous taking of his or her own organs, or consent to the taking
of organs from a deceased relative, as an act of charity, a work of super-
erogation lying beyond the call of moral duty.
This Article initially demonstrates the falsity of each of these as-
sumptions. Policy alternatives are then proposed to govern donor re-
cruitment and the activities of organ procurement and distribution. These
alternatives are consistent with the correct assumptions on the issues
mentioned, and appear to be politically feasible in the light of available
empirical evidence.
I. INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING ORGAN PROCUREMENT
AND DONOR RECRUITMENT IN THE UNITED STATES;
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY REVISION
A. The Assumption that Validly Signed Donor Cards Have Merely an
Advisory or Expressive Function
1. Analysis
Organ procurement personnel typically consult with families of brain
dead or near brain dead potential donors to obtain family consent for the
removal and transfer of usable organs from their hospitalized relatives.
This policy is followed even if a potential donor has signed an organ donor
card like that attached to state drivers' licenses.1 Nationally, the number
Prottas, Encouraging Altruism: Public Attitudes and the Marketing of Organ
Donation, 61 MILBANK Q. 278, 284-85 (1983); Overcast, Evans, Bowen, Hoe &
Livak, Problems in the Identification of Potential Organ Donors, 251 J.A.M.A.
1559, 1561 (1984).
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of "declared donors" is on the rise. 2 The practice of asking survivors of
all potential donors (declared and undeclared) for permission to recover
organs from deceased kin conveys to these families the message that they
(the families) have final legal control over the disposition of the bodies
of their loved ones, irrespective of the latter's stated antemortem wishes
concerning posthumous organ donation.
A variety of reasons explain, but fail to justify on either legal or moral
grounds, this practice of procurement staff. A principal reason offered in
defense of the policy is that if procurement staff proceeded otherwise, i.e.,
if they initiated organ removal and transfer from a deceased declared
donor purely on the strength of the latter's written consent (without
asking his or her family), such a policy might ultimately jeopardize the
long term success of organ procurement efforts. The worry seems to be
that if families are not given the opportunity to decide whether organs
will be taken from the body of a deceased relative - irrespective of
whether the latter has given express prior consent to this procedure -
procurement personnel will quickly gain the reputation of being "organ
vultures" who care little about the feelings of grieving family members.3
Surviving kin typically believe that they have a right of some kind, moral
or legal, to determine whether invasions of the body of their loved one
will be permitted.
The doctrine that a family has a "quasi-property" interest in the body
of a dead relative pursuant to discharging its duty to provide the body
with a decent burial has long been accepted in American common law.4
At least since the turn of the century, however, this doctrine has stood
in tension with a competing principle which courts have affirmed at least
2 Aggressive efforts to apprise individuals of the opportunity to become post-
humous organ donors have met with marked recruitment success in numerous
cases. In 1984, sixty percent of the licensed drivers in Colorado were designated
donors. Overcast, Evans, Bowen, Hoe & Livak, supra note 1, at 1560; in Wash-
ington, D.C., the number of people signing donor cards appended to driver's li-
censes rose from 25 a month in 1982 to approximately 600 a month in 1985.
Levine, Why Blacks Need More Kidneys But Donate Fewer, 15 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 3 (1985); The Living Bank of Houston, Texas, reports that each time col-
umnist Abigail Van Buren publishes a moving essay by Robert Test (To Remember
Me), which clarifies the manner in which a person's body can after death serve
as a reservoir for lifesaving or debilityassisting organs and tissues for needy
others, that the Bank is "inundated" with requests for donor-registration forms.
Abigail Van Buren, Organ Donors' Gifts Precious Legacy to Living, St. Paul Pi-
oneer Press-Dispatch, Apr. 24, 1989, at 8D; summarizing the results of a 1987
study, Evans & Manninen report that "more people have received information
on organ donation than ever before and are carrying donor cards in increasing
numbers." Evans & Manninen, U.S. Public Opinion Concerning the Procurement
and Distribution of Donor Organs, 20 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 781 (No.
5, Oct.) (1988).
Overcast, Evans, Brown, Hoe & Livak, supra note 1, at 1562.
See Vestal, Taber & Shoemaker, Medico-Legal Aspects of Tissue Homotran-
splantation, 18 U. DET. L.J. 271 (1955); Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal
Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation, 14 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL L. REV. 442
(1965); Marshall, Testamentary Rights of Bodily Disposition, 18 A.B.A.J. 31
(1982).
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rhetorically. The principle is that a person's antemortem declarations
concerning the disposition of his or her corpse (concerning the place or
manner of burial) should be respected if at all possible. 5 Where statute
has explicitly stated that the antemortem wishes of the deceased take
precedence over opposing views of relatives, courts have decided in favor
of the deceased.6 Where statute has been silent about how such conflicts
should be resolved, courts have tended to find some reason, however
strained, for siding with the wishes of the dissenting family.7
The model Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of 1968,8 on which
most state anatomical gift acts are patterned, unequivocally grants pri-
mary authority to determine what shall be done with the body or parts
of a decedent to the person to whom the body belongs. If a person signs
a donation instrument (it need not be a will, it can be a card carried on
the person 9 ), that individual's family, according to the UAGA, is not vested
with power to veto the declaration, nor is the family's express agreement
with the decedent's wishes legally required to affect the removal and
transfer of organs from his or her body.'0 If, however, the decedent has
not made a declaration concerning the posthumous disposition of his or
her body or parts, yet has not objected to such taking, then the UAGA
gives authority to individuals in other categories (e.g., kin by blood or
marriage), and in a descending order of priority, to provide such consent. "
Despite the first authority granted by the UAGA to individuals to
control the disposition of their own bodies or body parts after death, organ
procurement personnel in the United States routinely ask families of dead
or medically hopeless incompetent declared consenters for permission to
remove organs from these individuals. 2 Subjecting the written and duly
5 Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904); Wood v. Butterworth
& Sons, 65 Wash. 344, 118 P. 212 (1911); Estate of Henderson, 13 Cal. App.2d
449, 57 P.2d 212 (1936); In re Johnson's Estate, 169 Misc. 215, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81
(1938).
6 In re Eichner's Estate, 173 Misc. 644, 18 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1940).
7 Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 P. 170 (1900); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v..
Heller, 16 N.J. Super. 285, 84 A.2d 485 (1951); In re Estate of Angela C. Kaufman,
158 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1956); Holland v. Metalious, 105 N.H. 290. 198 A.2d 654 (1964).
8 UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983) (See Supp. 1990 for
1987 amendments to the Act) [hereinafter UAGA].
9 UAGA § 4(b) (1983).
10 UAGA §§ 2(a) & 2(e) (1983). "Any individual of sound mind and 18 years of
age or more may give all or any part of his body for any purpose specified in
Section 3, the gift to take effect upon death." UAGA § 2(a) (1983). "The rights of
the donee [the person or institution authorized to receive the gift - see Section
3 of the UAGA] created by the gift are paramount to the rights of others except
as provided in Section 7(d) [which refers to the preemptive rights of coroners,
medical examiners, and other physicians in performing autopsies required by law
(and § 2(e))]. UAGA § 2(e) (1983) (In the 1987 amendments, Section 2(e) was
moved to Section 8(a). The language was slightly modified and now provides:
"Rights of a donee created by anatomical gift are superior to the rights of others
except with respect to autopsies under Section 11(b)."). The Commissioners' com-
mentary on Section 2(e) leaves no doubt about their intent: "subsection (e) rec-
ognizes and gives legal effect to the right of the individual to dispose of his own
body without subsequent veto by others." (emphasis added). UAGA § 2(c) comment
(1983).
11 UAGA § 2(b) (1983).
12 See authorities cited supra note 1.
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witnessed antemortem consent of a dead or near-death patient to possible
veto by his or her family is a violation of both the spirit and the letter
of the UAGA. 13
This point appears to be misunderstood even by professionals involved
in the activity of organ procurement. In a 1987 issue of the nationally
distributed publication, RN, the administrator and coordinator of the
organ recovery program at Presbyterian Hospital in New York City ad-
vises nurses who may have to ask a family for an organ donation from
a deceased loved one:
Remember ... that any family has the legal right to say 'No'
[to donation] even though the patient was carrying a donor
card permitting the retrieval of his organs for use in trans-
plants.14
As a generalization concerning the alleged legal right of a family to veto
a loved one's written antemortem consent to posthumous organ donation,
this statement is incorrect. Special provisions of the anatomical gift acts
of New York State15 (where the administrator works) and Florida16 ar-
guably permit such a veto, though the statutory wording is unclear. Leg-
islation governing gifts of body parts in all other states, however, does
not grant to families the right of veto over the prior written consent of
deceased relatives to the posthumous taking of organs from their own
bodies after death.1 7
The fact that most families of declared consenters permit the recovery
of organs from such patients when apprised of the latter's wishes 8 is
irrelevant to assessing the propriety of routinely asking families of all
recently deceased donors - declared and undeclared - for permission to
remove organs from these individuals. A patient's explicitly stated an-
temortem wishes concerning the posthumous disposition of his or her
body parts is not subject to override by the contrary wishes of kin, except
arguably in the two jurisdictions mentioned. According to the provisions
of most state UAGAs, a family has neither the legal authority to veto a
declared consenter's wishes, nor the legal responsibility to validate such
an individual's directives.
Other independent reasons support the controlling legal authority
vested by the UAGA in individuals as regards the posthumous disposition
of their own body parts. A key buttressing claim is that a person's body
is his or her property in an intelligible and important sense. At law,
"property" does not refer to a physical object or objects, but rather to a
cluster of rights recognized in the object(s).' 9 Property is either real or
13 See supra note 10.
14 Kiernan, If You Have to Ask for an Organ Donation, RN, Oct. 1987, at 114.
15 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 430(3) (McKinney 1985).
16 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.912(3) (West Supp. 1989).
17 See table of provisions of state UAGAs in Lee & Kissner, Organ Donation
and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 100 SURGERY 867, 869 (1986).
18 Prottas, supra note 1, at 287.
'9 63A AM. JuR. 2d Property § 1 (1984); HONORE, Ownership, in OxFoRD ESSAYs
IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-24 (Guest ed. 1961).
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personal. Personal property is classified further as either corporeal or
incorporeal. Corporeal property refers to tangible, physical entities; in-
corporeal property to various rights in the thing (res) recognized and
enforced by the courts.20 Among the cluster of overlapping rights bound
up with the concept of ownership are the following:
(1) a right of possession
(2) a right of exclusion
(3) a right of disposition
(4) a right of use
(5) a right to enjoy fruits or profits
(6) a right of destruction.2 1
Besides the already mentioned right under the UAGA to decide
whether one's own organs will be available for removal and transfer after
death, American law currently recognizes a number of other rights con-
nected with the human body as corporeal property. The human body is
a material thing.22 Moreover, common law has long accorded individuals,
at least rhetorically, the right to determine the place of their own burial,
or whether they will be cremated.2 3 This right was forthrightly acknowl-
edged by the Utah Supreme Court in In re Moyer,24 decided after Utah
had passed its version of the UAGA in 1969. The decedent had specified
in his will that his body was to be cremated. His mother ignored the
declaration and had the body buried. The decedent's personal represen-
tative challenged the action and petitioned that the body be exhumed
and cremated as the decedent had directed. The Moyer court stated that
by enacting the UAGA, the Utah legislature had "recognized that a person
has property rights in his body" which apply to the disposition of his body
after death, 25 as long as the directive does not involve the waste of property
or offend public sensibilities.2 6
In medical law, a person's body cannot be invaded or operated upon
without that individual's informed consent 27 - a protection suggesting
- 63A AM. JUR. 2d Property §§ 1 & 11.
21 R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.1,
at 1 (1984) [hereinafter THE LAW OF PROPERTY]; For a slightly different classi-
ficatory scheme, see Honore, supra note 19; see also 63A AM. JUR. 2d Property §
34.
22 63A AM. JUR. 2d Property § 11.
2 See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text.
24 In re Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978).
Id. at 110, n.4.
26 Id. at 110.
27 In Scholendorf v. Society of New York Hosps., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914), Justice Benjamin Cardozo made the following declaration concerning med-
ical care: "Every human being of adult years has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id.
at 93. An individual's constitutional privacy right embraces the right to make
potentially fatal decisions about his or her own medical treatment. See In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See also In
re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 (1972);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
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the property right of exclusion. Moreover, bodily tissues and fluids such
as blood, skin, semen, and saliva have long been bought and sold in the
United States.28 Recently, a California appellate court ruled that cells
from the surgically removed spleen of a patient that were converted,
without the patient's knowledge, into pharmaceutical products of enor-
mous therapeutic and commercial value are the patient's personal prop-
erty over which he has the ultimate power of disposition.29 Thus, a
persuasive case can be marshalled for the claim that the relation of a
person to his or her own body exhibits many of the so-called "incidents"
of ownership. Under common law it is not necessary that all of the rel-
evant indicia of ownership apply for something to qualify as property.
30
In sum, the controlling right which the UAGA gives to individuals to
decide whether their own body parts will be available for removal and
transfer after death can be defended on the ground that a person's body
is his or her property in an intelligible and significant sense. In the present
writer's view, this claim establishes a substantial burden of proof to show
why the family of a deceased declared donor should be asked for permis-
sion to remove organs from the individual, thereby in principle subjecting
the decedent's prior declaration to possible veto.
It is also worth noting in this connection that all individuals queried
in a recent study - both declared consenters and those who had not
signed donor cards - agreed that no relative of a deceased declared
consenter (or of a deceased declared objector, 31 for that matter) should
28 R. SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 190 (1981).
29 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 249 Cal.Rptr. 494
(1988), reh'g granted, 763 P.2d 479, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (Nov. 10, 1988).
10 THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 21, § 1.2, at 7; see also First Victoria Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1980).
-1 It is hard to imagine procurement staff in possession of a written and wit-
nessed objection by a person to the taking of his or her organs after death never-
theless asking that person's family whether they desire to donate their deceased
relative's organs. Subjecting a person's prior objection to postmortem organ do-
nation to possible family veto would, no doubt, strike most people as morally
wrong. Why then should it be less wrong to subject to family veto a person's
written prior consent to donation?
Many states have recently added so-called "required request" legislation to
their respective UAGAs. This legislation places a legal obligation on hospitals to
make certain that families of potential donors dying in these institutions are
asked about the possibility of organ donation from these patients. It is noteworthy,
however, that the wording of many of these required request laws explicitly
excepts a hospital from making the request if the decedent has personally au-
thorized, by a valid instrument, the removal and transfer of his or her own organs
after death. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.50.014(a) (1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
1509(a) (1988); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2910.1.A (West Supp. 1989);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.500 (1987). It is clear that the required request
legislation in these states is fully consistent with the original provisions of their
state UAGAs which prohibit family override of a decedent's prior written positive
decision to donate.
32 Corlett, Public Attitudes Toward Human Organ Donation, 17 TRANSPLAN-
TATION PROCEEDINGS 103 (No. 6, Supp. 3) (1985), at 106; see also Manninen &
Evans, Public Attitudes and Behavior Regarding Organ Donation, 253 J.A.M.A.
3111 (1985); Robinette & Stiller, Summary of Task Force Proceedings, 17 TRANS-
PLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 9 (Supp. 3) (1985).
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have the right to countermand the express antemortem directives of an
individual concerning the disposition of his or her organs after death. 2
Also, the majority of respondents in a survey conducted in connection
with the National Heart Transplantation Study stated that if someone
signs an organ donor card, this decision should not need to be approved
by his or her family after death.33
2. Recommendations
The foregoing considerations provide strong grounds for demanding
a revision in the standard approach used by organ procurement personnel
in counseling the family of a deceased or near-death declared consenter.
Procurement staff should tactfully and sensitively inform the family of
their loved one's explicitly stated and legally binding declaration to serve
as a posthumous organ provider. They should also convey to the family
the assurance that hospital staff will do everything possible to affect the
transfer to needy others of their relative's life-saving organs as the latter
has directed. In other words, the family of a declared donor should not
be asked for permission to remove organs from such an individual. Rather,
Evans, Manninen, Overcast, Garrison, Yagi, Jonsen, et al., THE NATIONAL
HEART TRANSPLANTATION STUDY: FINAL REPORT, Executive Summary 33-34 (Se-
attle, Wash.: Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers, 1984) [hereinafter TRANS-
PLANTATION STUDY].
34 It is instructive to compare the responsibilities of the person or institution
occupying the position of "donee" as defined by the UAGA (i.e., the person or
institution authorized to receive the body or body parts of a deceased declared
donor) to that of a coroner or medical examiner in circumstances where: (a) in
the case of a donee, the decedent's family objects to the taking of organs from
their loved one or (b) in the case of a coroner, the decedent's family objects to the
performance of an autopsy required by law. Rho reports that "direct challenges
to the legal right of medical examiners to perform autopsies have invoked one or
more of the following arguments: religious tenets forbidding autopsies, mental
anguish and grief to the next of kin, and the right of the next of kin to possession
of the decedent's body." Rho, Medical Examiner's Authority, 81 NEW YORK STATE
J. MED. 1687 (1981). Nevertheless, Rho avers, "the private right of a deceased
person's family to prevent an autopsy is subservient to governmental interest as
far as is deemed necessary." Id. (citing R. LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW (3d
ed. 1968)). In the circumstance where a decedent's family objects to a legally
required autopsy for any of the reasons cited, Rho says that the medical examiner
"or his office should undertake an effort to explain to the family why the autopsy
has to be done. This requires a high degree of understanding and sensitivity on
the part of the medical examiner. More often than not, the family will comply
with the medical examiner's decision for an autopsy after an explanatory session.
It is only after all such efforts fail that the law must intervene. A blunt and
bureaucratic approach will only aggravate the hostility of the family and the
public." Id.
In the organ donation context, the most accessible person authorized to function
as donee will typically be the attending physician of the deceased declared donor.
See UAGA supra note 8, at §§ 3, 4(c). And, as indicated in note 10 supra, prior
to amendment, Section 2(e) of the UAGA unequivocally stated that "[t]he rights
of the donee created by the gift are paramount to the rights of others except as
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they should be considerately informed that retrieval procedures will be
implemented in deference to their loved one's prior decision.3 4 It is no-
teworthy that, according to a 1984 study, this procedure is already used
by procurement staff in four states - California, Colorado, Florida and
Wyoming. 35 The procedure should be standard whenever procurement
personnel counsel families of declared consenters.
That such a procedural change would likely be accepted by the ma-
jority of citizens is supported by the empirical evidence noted above,
namely, that (a) most families of declared consenters do grant permission
when asked and apprised of the decedent's stated desire to be a posthu-
mous organ provider,3 6 and (b) most people queried in the surveys cited37
believe that survivors should not have veto power over a person's ante-
mortem wishes concerning the disposition of his or her body after death.
The recommended procedural change, then, appears to be politically fea-
sible.
provided by § 7(d) [which affirms the pre-emptive rights of coroners and medical
examiners to conduct autopsies as mandated by statute]."
Section 7(a) of the UAGA stated that "[t]he donee may accept or reject the
gift." § 7(a) (1983) (In the 1987 amendments, Section 7(a) was moved to Section
8(a). The language of this Section now reads: "A donee may accept or reject an
anatomical gift.") This raises an important question of interpretation: Is the donee
at liberty to reject an anatomical gift, the transplantable body parts of the de-
cedent, for just any reason, for example, to avoid the ire of the decedent's family
who opposes removal of organs from their loved one? This is unclear. What is
clear is that if any of the decedent's body parts are medically unacceptable, that
is, are malignant or infected, the donee can and will refuse the gift.
On the other hand, where a declared donor's organs are medically acceptable,
one must remember that the decedent doubtless gave antemortem consent to
posthumous donation because the person wanted his or her body parts to be
transferred, if possible, to those facing imminent death or severe disability with-
out them. Hence, if at the moment of a declared donor's death there are in fact
individuals who could benefit from the declared donor's organs (over which the
physician-donee exercises custody), then the physician arguably has a legal duty
to begin the process of organ retrieval from the deceased by notifying the nearest
organ procurement agency of the availability of the person's body parts. If this
intepretation of donees' responsibilities is defensible, then a donee should proceed
with respect to a dissenting family in the same manner that Rho recommends
that a coroner proceed with a family who objects to an autopsy on a relative who
has died of unusual or suspected unlawful causes. The donee should tactfully and
sympathetically inform the family of what must be done in deference to the legal
right of the decedent which is at stake in this case, namely, the decedent's right
to control by prior directive the disposition of his or her own body parts after
death. Able discussion of the psychological issues connected with counseling sur-
vivors and recommended counseling techniques are provided in several sources.
See Miles, The Impact of Sudden Accidental Death on Bereaved Survivors, in
BEREAVEMENT: HELPING THE SURVIVORS 152-58 (M.A. Morgan ed. 1987); Weber,
The Human Connection: The Role of the Nurse in Organ Donation, 17 J. NEU-
ROSURG. NuRs. 119 (1985); Youngner, Allen, Bartlett, Cascorbi, Hau, Jackson,
Mahowald & Martin, Psychosocial and Ethical Implications of Organ Retrieval,
313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 321 (1985) (hereinafter Organ Retrieval].
35 Overcast, Evans, Bowen, Hoe & Livak, supra note 1, at 1562.
Prottas, supra note 1, at 287.
31 Corlett, supra note 32, at 106; TRANSPLANTATION STUDY, supra note 33.
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B. The Assumption that Consenting to the Posthumous Taking of One's
Own Organs is an Act of Charity, Not a Moral Duty
1. Analysis
Media appeals that encourage people to sign organ donor cards typ-
ically speak of a person's consenting to the postmortem removal and
transfer of his or her organs/tissues as the making of an anatomical "gift"
or "donation." The terms "gift," "donor," and "donee" are also used in all
state statutes patterned after the UAGA which govern the removal and
transfer of body parts from cadavers. 3 These terms are accurate to the
extent that those who consent to such procedures neither expect, nor are
they legally permitted to receive, money for the excised organs and tis-
sues.39 But the terms also suggest that giving such consent is an act of
charity - something that is praiseworthy for people to do, but not some-
thing that is clearly required by moral duty such that adequate excusing
reasons for nonconsent are thought to be a legitimate expectation. As
Arthur Caplan observes: "For many years the rhetoric of public education
in the organ procurement field has been that of charity. '40 Consenting to
the posthumous taking of one's own organs, or consenting to the taking
of organs from the body of a deceased loved one, has been and still is
typically viewed as an act of human kindness. According to Prottas and
Batten41 and a 1985 Gallup poll,42 most Americans view organ donors as
"loving, generous people who care about others." Commenting on the
forces that led to the drafting of the Model Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
in 1968 and its quick adoption thereafter by the vast majority of states,
Caplan states:
Free choice and voluntarism played key parts in the moral and
legal arguments that surrounded the passage of this legisla-
tion. Proponents of donor cards, donor statements on drivers'
licenses, and other forms of living wills argued that a system
of cadaver organ procurement built on voluntarism would pro-
mote socially desirable virtues, such as altruism, and at the
same time protect the rights of persons who might, for various
reasons, oppose the procurement of tissues from cadavers. 43
38 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2710-2719 (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26:6-57-26:6-65 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8601-8607
(Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5231-5237 (1987).
39 National Organ Transplantation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274(E) (1984) Title III.
40 Caplan, Requests, Gifts, and Obligations: The Ethics of Organ Procurement,
18 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 49, 55 (No. 3, Supp. 2) (1985).
41 Prottas & Batten, Attitudes & Incentives in Organ Procurement, Part II:
Attitudes of the American Public (Report to the Health Care Financing Admin-
istration, 1986).
42 Gallup Organization, Inc., The U.S. Public's Attitudes Toward Organ Trans-
plantation/Organ Donation. Gallup survey, 1985.
4 Caplan, Ethical and Policy Issues in the Procurement of Cadaver Organs for
Transplantation, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981, 982 (1984).
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Fully consistent with the view that consenting to the removal of one's
own organs after death is an act beyond the requirement of strict moral
duty is the following claim of David Ogden, past president of the National
Kidney Foundation. Ogden argues against a proposal to institute routine
removal of cadaver organs based on the legal doctrine of presumed con-
sent. That doctrine holds that unless an individual expressly objects dur-
ing life to the posthumous taking of organs from his or her body, the
person shall be presumed to have consented to such taking:
Presumed consent is not quite the American way. It is rela-
tively coercive, compared to the more classical freedom of choice
that characterizes our way of life. Consent should be positive,
not implied.4
4
This author maintains, however, that providing such consent is not
an act of charity. It is, rather, a moral duty of substantial stringency. The
duty to consent is an instance of a more general moral duty variously
called the duty of mutual aid,45 or the duty to attempt an easy rescue of
an endangered person.46 This general moral duty is the foundation of laws
enacted in two states, Vermont 47 and Minnesota, 48 and in fifteen foreign
countries, 49 which place a legal obligation on any citizen (not just medical
or law enforcement personnel) who encounters a person in serious danger
to assist the imperiled individual in any significantly helpful way that
does not involve undue cost or risk to the potential rescuer. Rhode Island5°
and Massachusetts5' have imposed on the general public an affirmative
"Ogden, Another View on Presumed Consent, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28(1983). In 1976, France adopted a presumed consent law governing cadaveric
organ retrieval, the so-called "Caillavet Law." The following comment on this law
by a recent author is noteworthy in connection with the basic argument to follow
in this paper which maintains that consenting to the posthumous taking of one's
own organs is a moral duty, a duty derivative from the same general moral duty,
that stands at the foundation of so-called "Good Samaritan" laws in the United
States and numerous foreign countries: "If the Caillavet Law gives greater weight
to the needs of the transplant recipient than to the possibility that the individual
will of the donor has been violated.., such a balancing accords with French legal
recognition of the "Good Samaritan" principle. The French penal code mandates
punishment of one who voluntarily abstains from aiding someone in peril, without
risk to himself. Thus, the potential donor who is deceased and who has failed to
object to organ retrieval may be viewed as a Good Samaritan bearing a legal
duty to assist those waiting for transplants." Gerson, Refining the Law of Organ
Donation: Lessons from the French Law of Presumed Consent, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L.
L. & POL. 1013, 1027 (1987).45 Reeder, Beneficience, Supererogation, and Role Duty, in BENEFICENCE AND
HEALTH CARE (Shelp ed. 1982).
"Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic
Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REv. 252 (1983).
47 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
48 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West 1988).
49 Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Russia, Turkey, Denmark, Poland,
Germany, Rumania, France, Hungary, Czechoslavkia, Belgium, and various can-
tons of Switzerland. For a discussion and full citations see Rudzinski, The Duty
to Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 91 (Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
5 R.I. GEN. LAWS, §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.3 (Michie 1989).
51 MASS. GEN. LAWS Ann. ch. 268, § 40 (West Supp. 1989).
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legal duty to assist strangers in emergency situations, though this duty
is of a more limited nature than that required under the Vermont and
Minnesota statutes.
The conditions under which the legal duty of mutual aid (or easy
rescue) arises in the "Good Samaritan" legislation cited above are de-
scribed by Weinrib.5 2 Weinrib's analysis may conveniently serve as the
first approximate specification of the conditions which generate the gen-
eral moral duty of mutual aid upon which these laws are founded.
1. The emergency condition - someone is caught in a situation
that is likely to get worse unless the victim is assisted (e.g.,
the victim might die or suffer grave injury absent help).
2. The convenience condition - a witness is in a position to
render assistance without significant cost or risk to self (e.g.,
by summoning police, throwing a life preserver, by keeping
the victim warm, or by shouting a warning, etc.).
A more detailed analysis of the conditions under which the general moral
duty of mutual aid arises is offered by Beauchamp and Childress.53 They
refer to the duty as the "duty of beneficence." The following embellishes
slightly on their analysis:
Apart from the existence of special moral relationships such as con-
tracts, promises, or roles, X has a duty to assist Y only if all of the following
conditions exist:
1. Y is at risk of significant loss or damage,
2. X's action is needed to prevent this loss,
3. X's action would probably prevent it,
4. X's action would not present significant cost or risk to X,
5. The benefit that Y will probably gain far outweighs any
harms that X is likely to suffer, and
6. X knows, or a reasonable person in X's position would rec-
ognize, that conditions 1-5 exist.
Consider paradigm emergency situations like the 1964 murder of
Kitty Genovese in Queens, New York 54 or the 1983 pool table rape of a
woman in a New Bedford, Massachusetts tavern.55 Most of us believe that
in such circumstances any witness is under a clear moral obligation to
assist the victim (or victims) when such assistance can be provided at zero
or minimal cost/risk to the potential provider of aid. We are abhorred by
the inaction of those who just stood by and made no effort to assist these
victims by so simple an act as summoning police. We think that very
good reasons must be supplied for failing to do anything when something
could have been done that would have posed zero or little cost/risk to
potential assisters.
52 Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 280-81, 285 (1980).
T.L. BEAUCHAMP & J.F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 153
(2d ed. 1983).
54. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1964, at 1, col. 4.
5 The Tavern Rape: Cheers and No Help, Newsweek, Mar. 21, 1983, at 25.
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By analogy, this writer maintains, any relatively healthy individual
who understands that as a result of accidental fatal head trauma, he or
she would then become a potential resource for organs capable of saving
one or more end-stage organ disease (ESOD) victims needing transplants
at that moment, is under a moral obligation to now explicitly consent to
the posthumous taking of his or her own organs for this lifesaving purpose.
In other words, the relationship between any living individual (whose
body can, at the moment of accidental death, function as a repository of
lifesaving organs) to those who at the time of the individual's death are
dying of various ESODs, is similar in sufficient relevant respects to the
relationship between a potential rescuer and endangered individuals cov-
ered by the Good Samaritan laws discussed earlier. Hence, all potential
organ providers have a prima facie moral duty to take the steps necessary
to ensure that their organs will be available for lifesaving use after death.
Several objections may be lodged against the analogy. One might
challenge the fundamental assumption on which the entire argument
rests, the assumption, namely, that under the conditions enumerated by
Beauchamp and Childress,56 an individual in a position to assist a seri-
ously imperiled person has a moral duty to provide aid when this can be
done at zero or minimum cost/risk to the potential rescuer. It might be
argued that refraining from aiding an endangered person amounts to
withholding a benefit from that person, not inflicting harm upon that
person. And while, concededly, there is a general moral duty to refrain
from causing harm to others, there is no general moral duty to benefit
others. Hence, the so-called moral duty of mutual aid is not really a duty
at all. Conferring benefits is always supererogatory, never obligatory.
Failing to render aid to a person in serious danger, even easily provided
aid, is therefore not a failure of moral duty.
This argument trades on a number of incorrect assumptions concern-
ing omissions (i.e., informed, intentional inactions), causality, and harm-
doing. If a father intentionally poisons his infant's food, he is
uncontroversially the cause of the child's death. If a father purposely
omits feeding his infant who consequently dies of starvation, again he is
the cause of the child's death, though his act may properly be described
as an omission. (It is implausible to describe his act as "withholding a
benefit" from the child). If a father spies his lightly-clad infant lying in
the snow and does nothing, and the child contracts pneumonia and dies,
then while the cause of death is the pneumonia, the father's inaction is
nonetheless a causal factor in the death of the infant. While his failure
to aid the child is not a harm-initiating action, it is a harm-exacerbating
action in that his failure to supply aid has effectively made the child
worse off.57 In Weinrib's terminology, the father's inaction is a "but-for
cause" of the child's death, 58 since the child would not have died had the
father removed his infant from the snow and procured medical care.
56 See supra text accompanying note 53.
57 The terminology is that of Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
382, 393 (1976).
58 Weinrib, supra note 52, at 253.
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The but-for test of factual causation focuses first on situations in
which a potential assister has failed to help someone exposed to danger
or harm, and then compares the actual course of events to a hypothetical
course of events that would have taken place had the potential assister
intervened. 59 Not rendering aid has causal character. Assigning respon-
sibility to potential assisters of vulnerable and helpless persons would be
inappropriate if it were never possible to prevent an impending harm
from materializing, or to prevent an already initiated harm from wors-
ening. But the latter clearly is not the case. Hence, imputing such re-
sponsibility to a potential assister is warranted, and warranted to the
strongest degree when the danger to the victim is great and the cost or
risk to the potential rescuer is small.
In Anglo-American law a father is liable for failing to provide aid to
his endangered child because the law views him as standing in a "special
relationship" to the child.60 Other special relationships include the re-
lationship of innkeeper to guest, employer to employee, carrier to pas-
senger, and proprieter to customer.61 The special relationship condition
for assigning liability to acts of omission or negligence is not, however,
a rationally satisfactory basis for confining the scope of legal liability for
inaction. And since it may be initially tempting to believe that the special
relationship condition also appropriately delimits the scope of our moral
duties to others who are vulnerable and helpless, it is pertinent to consider
a standard line of argument advanced by critics against the prevailing
Anglo-American legal doctrine that there is no general duty resting on
all citizens to provide aid to strangers in emergency situations.62
Consider the following examples provided by Bentham:
A woman's head-dress catches fire, water is at hand. A man,
instead of assisting to quench the fire, looks on and laughs at
it. A drunken man, falling with his face downwards into a
puddle, is in danger of suffocation: lifting his head to one side
would save him. Another man sees this and lets him die. A
quantity of gunpowder lies scattered about a room. A man is
going into it with a lighted candle. Another, knowing this, lets
him go in without warning. Who is there that in any of these
cases would think punishment misapplied?-
In each of these cases assume that the person capable of easily assisting
the endangered party stands in no special relationship to the victim; that
is, assume that they are strangers. Critics of the tendency of Anglo-
59 Id.
See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960).
61 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 338-50 (1971).
62 See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 2526 (1928); J.
FEINBERG, HARMTO OTHERS 126-86 (1984); Benditt, Liability for Failing to Rescue,
1 LAW & PHIL. 391 (1982); Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal
Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1273 (1983); Lipkin, supra note 46; Note, Bad Samar-
itanism and the Duty to Render Aid: A Proposal, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 315 (1985).
63 J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION 293 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970).
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American law to refuse to impose on all individuals a general legal duty
of easy rescue have asked: Why should potential assisters in cases like
those described by Bentham be free of legal responsibility to provide
relatively cost and risk-free aid? If the above-described father of the in-
sufficiently clothed child who was exposed to the elements has a legal
duty to assist the child in the circumstance, then why shouldn't any
stranger who happens upon the child have the same legal obligation?6
Common to all those special relationships which at law are thought
to impose on some member of the relationship (say, a parent, innkeeper,
employer) a duty to render aid to the complementary party in the rela-
tionship (e.g., an offspring, guest, employee) is a particular situational
structure: someone is in a helpless and vulnerable position and dependent
upon someone else who is in a position to easily provide help. But this
same structure obtains in those situations described by Bentham (and in
the Kitty Genovese murder and Massachusetts bar rape cases) in which
victims and potential rescuers are strangers. Hence, critics have urged,
it is inconsistent to confine the legal duty to aid imperiled individuals to
situations in which potential rescuers and victim(s) stand in special re-
lationships to each other.6 5
Now the relationship of any potential organ provider to those histo-
compatible end-stage organ disease (ESOD) victims who at the moment
of that person's death face imminent death themselves absent transplants
is, typically, a relationship between strangers. But if the foregoing ar-
gument is accepted, the mere lack of a special relationship between po-
tential organ provider and needy organ recipient(s) is not sufficient in
itself to defeat the claim that the potential provider has a moral duty to
take those steps necessary to ensure that his or her organs will be avail-
able for transfer to needy others at death, that is, a moral duty to sign
a "donor" card.
The analogy being advanced might be attacked on other grounds,
- Several cases illustrate the principled refusal of American common law to
impose legal liability on individuals who could have easily assisted seriously
endangered strangers but did not. See, e.g., Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160
N.E. 301 (1928) (Businessman who rented boat to intoxicated customer violated
no legal duty to the deceased, who was not in a helpless condition and was able
to take steps to protect himself from drowning); Handiboe v. McCarthy, 114 Ga.
App. 541, 151 S.E. 2d 905 (1966); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N. H. 257, 44 A.
809, 810-11 (1897) (Giving this example of the absence of a duty to rescue -
"Suppose A, standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe on the track,
and a car approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to himself,
and the instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps,justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in
damages for the child's injury, or indictable under the statute for its death." In
fact, the Buch court would not recognize any duty to rescue or protect a trespasser.)
Courts later imposed a duty of reasonable care upon property owners, see, e.g.,
Ovellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1975), including the duty to
take reasonable affirmative action to prevent further injury to trespasser en-
trapped in a position of peril. Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 896, 308
N.E.2d 469 (1974).
6 See authorities cited supra note 61.
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however. It might be contended that the sources of threats to endangered
individuals which come within the compass of the Good Samaritan leg-
islation cited (e.g., stabbings, shootings, beatings, rapes, etc.) are con-
spicuously different from the source of threat to those needing
transplants, namely, death from an organic disease. But why should the
kind of serious threat matter in making the comparison? Suppose a person
could easily assist a diabetic in insulin shock or apply CPR to someone
just seized by a heart attack? Surely such a person would be under a
moral obligation to provide such aid when this can be supplied at minimal
or zero cost/risk to the person.
Another objection might be that in the standard types of emergency
situations falling within the scope of Good Samaritan laws, the harm to
be relieved or prevented is one that is already being sustained by the
victim (e.g., physical injuries from a beating) or which will materialize
in seconds or minutes (e.g., death from drowning), whereas the death
faced by ESOD victims is a harm which will come to pass over an extended
period of time, perhaps six to eight months. But here again the alleged
significant dissimilarity between the compared cases is problematic. Lef-
ton reports that at any given time in 1985 there were six to eight heart
patients that were expected to die in 48 hours or were rejecting an already
implanted heart. 6
The analogy might be attacked in yet another way. One might call
attention to the fact that the peril faced by victims in the model emergency
situations is clearly visible to or audible by the witnesses owing to their
physical proximity to the beating, rape, or stabbing in progress, whereas
potential organ donors (i.e., all living individuals who could at any time
die from some sort of severe cerebral insult) are spatially removed from
those needing transplants, and thus are not directly aware of the danger
faced at any given moment by transplant candidates. This objection pur-
ports to attach moral significance to an epistemological distinction (bear-
ing upon condition 6 in Beauchamp's and Childress' criteria) 67 between
Lefton, New Worry About Donor Heart Supply, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 13,
1985, at 52.
67 An independent issue posed by this particular example is: How much of one's
income or time is required by the moral duty of mutual aid in the circumstances
described? Peter Singer insists that a plausible case can be made for the claim
that the level of assistance demanded is to give to the point of marginal utility,
to "the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself
or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift." Singer, Famine, Affluence, and
Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229 (1972).
Admittedly, the moral duty of mutual aid as applied to the problem of famine
relief raises difficult questions about the quantity of personal resources one is
required to provide to meet the minimum demands of the duty. Fortunately,
however, questions about the degree or extent of one's duty to assist imperiled
person in those model emergency situations covered by Good Samaritan laws are
not as intractable as in the famine relief case. If someone is drowning nearby
and a life-preserver is within easy reach of a potential rescuer, then clearly the
latter should throw the preserver to the victim. Or, in the case of those who
witnessed the Kitty Genovese assault, there surely is an obligation to at least
summon the police. In such circumstances there obviously is little or no cost
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direct and indirect knowledge of an emergency situation. The argument
presumes that direct knowledge of an emergency situation imposes a
greater responsibility on those in a position to help than does indirect
knowledge. But this claim too is suspect. If I visit Ethiopia and encounter
first-hand people who are starving, am I, simply because of my direct
knowledge of these people's plight, more morally obligated to assist them
(if I can contribute to this goal by a monetary contribution that places
me at no serious financial risk 68 ) than I was when I merely knew about
their desperate need through news reports and public appeals for dona-
tions? This seems doubtful. Admittedly, I may be psychologically more
inclined to respond to their need because of my personal acquaintance
with them. But this is not pertinent to assessing whether my prior indirect
knowledge of their plight imposed on me then a less strict duty to assist
than I now have according to the epistemologically based objection here
under consideration.
According to a national survey conducted in 1987, almost 99% of those
interviewed said that they had heard about organ transplantation and
84% said that they had received information concerning organ donation.6 9
There is reason to believe, then, that in the United States there is wide-
spread indirect knowledge about the critical need for organs for people
dying from ESODs. Such indirect knowledge is as pertinent to developing
the case for the moral duty to consent as any direct knowledge of the
plight of ESOD victims would be. Moreover, if the set of other independent
considerations material to establishing this duty are persuasive, the
weight of the duty will not vary in accordance with whether the potential
assister's knowledge of the emergency situation is direct or indirect.
Another counterargument to the analogy might be this. Dangers faced
by others (e.g., imminent death from various ESODs) at the moment of
my death are future dangers. Future dangers by definition do not exist.
Dangers that do not now exist cannot impose on me now a duty to respond
to them. Hence, I do not have a duty to now consent to the posthumous
removal and transfer of my organs.
Admittedly, the probability that at the moment of my death there
will be needy persons whose blood and tissue-type are sufficiently com-
patible with mine to benefit from receipt of my body parts is less than
1.0%. Nonetheless, it is more probable than not that there will be histo-
involved to potential rescuer(s).
It is far more controversial to insist that one has a further responsibility to
pay for the paramedics' service call or the victim's hospital bills if the victim
cannot afford it. As this author will argue shortly, a person's consenting to the
posthumous taking of his or her own organs for transfer to needy others is as cost
and risk free for the typically situated individual as throwing an easily obtainable
life preserver to a drowning victim, shouting a warning to someone facing an
impending danger, or summoning the police to the scene of a rape or assault.
Thus, the argument for the moral duty to consent to the posthumous taking of
one's own organs does not face as vexatious an array of questions concerning the
boundaries or limits of the duty of mutual aid as is generated by the famine relief
problem.
I See supra text accompanying note 53.
69 Evans & Manninen, supra note 2, at 782.
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compatible individuals capable of benefiting from one or more of my body
parts when I die. Each person's body is a reservoir of transplantable
organs and tissues of potential value to many others in need: heart,
kidneys, pancreas, liver, bone, skin, marrow, corneas, etc.70 Therefore,
while the probability is obviously less than 1.0% that at death my body
parts will be able to save at least one person from death or serious dis-
ability, the probability is high enough to impose on me now the duty to
prepare for this eventuality by signing a donor card. (Under the policy
revision recommended earlier, such a declaration will not be subject to
veto by others).
Perhaps the most important question connected with the acceptability
of the analogy is this: Are there in fact significant costs/risks connected
with expressly consenting to serve as a posthumous organ provider which
defeat the obligation to consent on the ground that condition (4) in Beau-
champ's and Childress' criteria remains unsatisfied? Someone might
claim, for example, that explicitly consenting to the postmortem removal
of his or her body parts does indeed generate significant cost or risk
because:71
(a) he or she is revulsed by the idea of being cut up after death;
(b) postmortem removal of body parts jeopardizes the possibility or
quality of the afterlife;
(c) posthumous removal of organs violates ritual or ethical rules of
his or her religious tradition;
(d) known consenters are likely to receive suboptimal care from med-
ical staff when they are hospitalized and in critical condition;
(e) organ removal disfigures the corpse and precludes the possibility
of an open casket funeral.
On a purely rational assessment, however, none of these beliefs stands
up to critical scrutiny:
- belief (a) reflects an irrational fear, given the other things
we already know will happen to our bodies after death (e.g.,
its inevitable decomposition over time, the intravenous
draining of blood during embalming procedures along with
tying off the penis, plugging the bodily orifices, etc);72
- belief (b) is inconsistent with traditional views concerning
divine omnipotence and the nature of the general resurrec-
tion;73
70 Department of Health and Human Services, Organ Transplantation: Issues
and Recommendations, Report of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation 160-
98 (Appendix C, Location of Transplant Centers and Tissue Banks) (Health Re-
sources and Services Admin. 1986).
71 The following reasons have been offered for not signing donor cards by in-
dividuals interviewed in polls and formal studies. See, e.g., Schulman, Getting
Organ.. .ized, 20 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 1025 (No. 1, Supp. 1) (1988);
Parisi & Katz, Attitudes Toward Posthumous Organ Donation and Commitment
to Donate, 5 HEALTH PSYCH. 565 (1986).
72 C. STRUB, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF EMBALMING 334-51 (L.G. Fred-
erick ed. 1959).
73 Gapen, Minority Organ Donors Encouraged, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 9, 1984,
at 19 (quoting C. Callendar).
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- belief (c) is valid only for orthodox Jews, according to some
but not all rabinnic interpretations,7 4 and possibly for Je-
hovah's Witnesses,
75
- belief (d) is false since medical personnel typically view the
loss of a patient as a professional failure,7 6 and no physician
receives any financial benefit by apprising organ procure-
ment agencies of potential donors under his or her care or
supervision;
77
- belief (e) is false because removal of organs and post-surgical
repair of the corpse leave no scars visible to viewers of the
body lying in state.
Except, then, for Orthodox Jews and possibly Jehovah's Witnesses,
who are able to legitimately advance claim (c), this writer contends that
the remainder of us are bound by the moral duty to consent; that is, for
all but the two cited groups, claims (a) - (e) above do not identify true
and significant costs/risks which defeat condition (4) in the set of criteria
specifying the conditions under which the duty to consent obtains.
2. Recommendations
Media appeals aimed at recruiting consenters should, then, acknowl-
edge that consenting is a moral duty, not charity. Such appeals should
also provide prospective consenters with accurate information concerning
issues (a) - (e). Correct information is capable of changing people's false
beliefs. There is evidence that those who object to or who are reticent
about donating organs from deceased kin because they believe that post-
mortem removal of body parts jeopardizes the possibility or quality of the
afterlife, can be persuaded of the unreasonableness of this belief by ra-
tional argument.78 Another study indicates that the belief that known -
consenters risk receiving suboptimal critical care, or that organ removal
disfigures the corpse, are amenable to change through receipt of accurate
information.7 9 Apprising people of the moral duty to consent, and dissem-
inating correct information on issues (a) - (e), for example, can be accom-
plished through those means now used for consenter recruitment;
brochures supplied by the National Kidney Foundation, the American
Council on Transplantation, and eye banks, and continuous-play video
74 Rosner, The Traditionalist Jewish Physician and Modern Biomedical Ethical
Problems, 8 J. MED. & PHL. 236 (1983).
75 Corlett, supra note 32, at 104.
76 Sophie, Intensive Care Nurses' Perceptions of Cadaver Organ Procurement,
12 HEART & LUNG 266 (1983); Organ Retrieval, supra note 34, at 322.
77 Caplan, Professional Arrogance and Public Misunaerstanding, 18 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 34, 36 (1988).
71 Gapen, supra note 73.
79 See Winkel, Public Communication on Donorcards: A Comparison of Per-
suasive Styles, 19 Soc. ScI. & MED. 957 (1984).
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tapes concerning posthumous organ removal and transfer available in
some state Department of Motor Vehicle offices.
II. THE DUTY TO CONSENT AND PRINCIPLES FOR FAIRLY ALLOCATING
ORGANS UNDER CONDITIONS OF SCARCITY
It bears noting, however, that if consenting is a moral duty, then that
duty clearly rests in the first instance upon the person whose body can
serve as a posthumous saving resource. The primary "obligee," in other
words, is the person himself or herself - not the person's family. As in-
dicated above, the provisions of the UAGA which give first authority to
the individual to control the disposition of his or her own body or body
parts after death can be morally defended by appeal to the plausible claim
that a person's body is his or her property in a significant sense.80 The
argument of the preceding section, however, was that for typically situ-
ated individuals, this right is overridden by the moral duty to consent.
Hence, if a person is apprised of the duty to consent through an infor-
mationally adequate recruitment appeal, and if he or she fails to make
an explicit yes or no decision concerning the posthumous taking of his or
her organs (thus passing this decision on to survivors), then that person
is shirking a moral responsibility incumbent upon him or her in the first
instance. This judgment of moral failure holds even if his or her family
happens to consent to the release of organs from the person's body after
death.
This analysis raises an important issue concerning the fair distri-
bution of organs under conditions of scarcity: why should needy individ-
uals who have been solicited by an informationally adequate consenter
recruitment appeal, but who have not personally agreed to the posthu-
mous taking and transfer of their own organs (i.e., who have not fulfilled
their moral duty to consent), be given equal access to the pool of cadaver
organs with those who have agreed to the taking of their body parts after
death? Assuming equal need and prospect of transplant success for two
individuals, A and B, if A is a declared consenter and B is not, then A's
prior fulfillment of moral duty arguably stands as a morally acceptable
reason for providing A with a histocompatible available organ ahead of B.
A law passed by the Parliament of Singapore in 1986 - The Human
Organ Transplant Act - adopts this principle for allocating cadaver kid-
neys in conjunction with a kidney retrieval practice based on the legal
theory of presumed consent.8 ' The premise of the Singapore law is that
unless an individual expressly objects to the posthumous taking of his or
her organs, he or she shall be presumed to have consented to such taking.
Under the Singapore law, those who object to serving as posthumous
kidney providers are given second-priority access to the cadaver kidney
80 See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
I" See Iyer, Kidneys for Transplant - "Opting Out" Law in Singapore, 35
FORENSIC ScI. INT'L 131 (1987).
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pool in the event of need; that is, only if an available kidney is not able
to be used by a needy non-objector (i.e., a presumed consenter), will it be
offered to a needy objector. This priority principle for distributing scarce
kidneys is, however, theoretically independent of the policy of presumed
consent. It applies as well to a retrieval policy based on explicit consent,
or "opting in," as it is frequently called. Under the latter policy - the
one operative in the United States - the Singapore priority principle
would dictate that only if an individual explicitly agrees to the taking of
his or her organs after death shall he or she be given first priority access
to the cadaver organ pool in the event of need.
The current United States policy of opting in is, as I argued above,
tied to and colored by the incorrect assumption that opting in is a char-
itable act, a work of supererogation. But if (i) opting in is a moral duty
resting in the first instance upon each individual (not upon his or her
family), and (ii) it is neither morally nor legally defensible to permit
families to veto the antemortem decisions of dead relatives regarding the
posthumous disposition of their organs, then it seems eminently fair to
conjoin to our "opt in" retrieval policy, a distribution policy giving first
priority access to the cadaver organ pool to those who have consented
and thus have personally made possible the lifesaving organ pool itself.
Needy nonconsenters would be given second priority access as in the
Singapore law.
The revised policy I recommend offers at least two incentives to pro-
vide express antemortem consent: (a) the recognition that consenting is
a moral duty; and/or (b) the fear that one might go without a needed
organ because of the second-priority status accorded nonconsenters. It is
plausible to believe that more people might respond to the appeal to duty
than to the appeal to charity since duty provides a more morally stringent
reason for acting than does charity. The fear of going without a needed
organ is of course a prudential rather than a moral reason. But a distri-
bution policy does not become morally suspect merely because some people
may act only in accordance with duty rather than from duty (to use a
Kantian distinction).8 2
In the remainder of this essay an attempt will be made to fill in some
of the details of how such a unified approach to consenter recruitment
and organ procurement and distribution might operate to demonstrate
its practical and political feasibility.
III. OPERATIONALIZING THE PROPOSED PROCUREMENT-DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
A. Procedural Mechanisms for Allaying Fears of Dying
Prematurely from Medical Neglect
As previously discussed,8 3 one of the risks some people believe to be
\connected with giving express antemortem consent to the posthumous
82 1. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 1 (1785).
1 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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taking of their own organs is the risk of receiving suboptimal critical care
if they are hospitalized and medical staff know that they are declared
consenters. This worry has no basis in fact, as already indicated.
84 It must
be addressed, nevertheless, in consenter recruitment appeals. This goal
can be accomplished partly through disseminating correct information
on this matter. The fear in question can be further reduced if one or both
of the following safeguards are mandated in connection with organ pro-
curement procedures, and the public is apprised of these protective mech-
anisms in consenter recruitment messages.
1. Increase the secrecy or privacy of consent by recording an individ-
ual's consent in a computer registry85 that can be tapped only by autho-
rized medical personnel after the person has been declared brain dead.
This procedure would keep medical professionals ignorant of a person's
donor status while they are caring for the patient. If people want to carry
cards that openly declare their desire to be posthumous sources of organs
and tissues, they would of course be free to do so.
2. Permit participants in the program who have recorded their express
consent in the private registry to make the actual posthumous taking of
their organs/tissues contingent upon a validating consent given by some-
one whom they specifically designate to authorize this release. 86 The ap-
pointed validator of the person's original registered consent would be in
a position to monitor the care given to the incompetent declared consenter
and would be empowered to withhold or refuse validation if he or she
believed that the medical staff were fudging or had fudged on their profes-
sional responsibility to provide beneficial medical care up to the limit
specified by the patient in oral conversations with the validator, or in a
living will or durable power of attorney for health care document. The
assumption is that the person picked to be the validator will be someone
whom the consenter trusts and who will be well aware that the consenter
does strongly desire to have his or her usable organs transferred to others
upon death. The only contingency is that the consentor be given at least
the expected level of medical care when incompetent and in critical con-
dition.
If both of these protective devices were available to consenters, the
worries concerning suboptimal treatment now harbored by many current
nonconsenters should be significantly reduced.
84See supra note 76.
Technical details for operating such a registry are discussed in Dewhurst,
A Computerized Kidney Donorship Register, 11 JOURNAL OF MED. Sys. 381 (1987);
see also Ross, Dewhurst & Salaman, A Computerized Kidney Donor Register -
One Year Review, 20 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 816 (No. 5, Oct.) (1988)
This idea is suggested by Childress in a different context. See Childress,
Some Moral Connections Between Organ Procurement and Organ Distribution, 3
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH, L. & POL'Y 85, 93 (1987).
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B. Issues of Justice in Granting/Denying First-Priority
Access to the Cadaver Organ Pool
1. The Problem of the "Procrastinating Nonconsenter"
Another problem likely to arise is that of people putting off registering
consent until they discover that they either have, or are at high risk for
acquiring, some medical problem that might require an organ or tissue
transplant in the future. By hypothesis, such an individual could not, or
would likely be unable to serve as a posthumous provider to others of the
specific organ/tissue which he or she might eventually need.
One way of addressing this problem might be to establish the follow-
ing connection between registering consent and eligibility to receive or-
gans/tissues. Since from a medical point of view, younger healthy
individuals who die of accidents are generally the best sources for cadaver
transplants, 7 the distribution policy could require that all persons 18
years of age or older at the time the policy is officially established have
three years in which to register. During this initial sign-up period, no
distinction would be made between registrants and non-registrants as
regards first- and second-priority access to the pool in the event of need.
After this initial three year period, however, anyone who was 18 or older
when the policy was inaugurated, but who did not enroll during this
period, would automatically be granted second-priority access to the pool.
Should any of these people choose to register later, they would still retain
second-priority status for some period of time thereafter (perhaps two
years). Individuals below the age of 18 at the time the policy is instituted
might be automatically granted first-priority status until the age of 21,
even without registering. If they registered after their 21st birthday,
however, they would be assigned second-priority status for at least two
years, with a conversion to first-priority status thereafter. This policy
should provide sufficient incentive to register at a young age when the
probability of imminently needing an organ or tissue is low.
2. Accommodating Nonconsent for Religious Reasons
There is an important difficulty connected with granting first-priority
access to the organ/tissue pool to those who decline to consent for religious
reasons: How does one distinguish between valid and invalid religious
objections? The latter will no doubt embrace beliefs that will be judged
as superstitious by adherents of or sympathizers with a specific religious
persuasion who have seriously considered the beliefs in question. Howard
University surgeon Clive Callendar calls attention to this problem among
blacks. Members of certain black churches, according to Callendar, are
often reluctant to consent to the taking of kidneys from dead relatives
87 Somerville, "Procurement" vs. "Donation" - Access to Tissues and Organs
for Transplantation: Should "Contracting Out" Legislation Be Adopted?, 17
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 53, 55 (No. 6, Supp. 4) (1985).
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because of unexamined religious worries that postmortem organ excision
might jeopardize the possibility or quality of resurrection life. Callendar,
himself a black, frequently persuades hesitant families to permit kidney
retrieval from a deceased loved one by using the following approach: "If
God is capable of getting you together, it doesn't matter whether there's
almost nothing left or not. If He's going to create the resurrection miracle,
He doesn't need your kidneys to do it. ' ' 8
Presumably, then, it is not impossible to distinguish between religious
objections to consenting that are considered and those that are unreflec-
tive. The religious objection of, say, an orthodox Jew to the posthumous
removal of his or her organs and tissues would probably be defensible. 89
The major religious groups have, however, explicitly endorsed the post-
humous taking and use of human organs for transplantation. If the
distribution of lifesaving body parts under the proposed revised policy is
to accommodate religious objectors on a first-priority basis, there needs
to be some means of distinguishing between valid and invalid religious
objections.
One procedure for doing this might be the following. To be eligible
for first-priority access to the organ/tissue pool, those who decline to
consent on religious grounds would have to show that (a) they are mem-
bers of an organization that is recognized by the state as a "religious"
group (e.g., this designation might be the basis of the group's tax exempt
status) and (b) that the organization's formally stated articles of faith or
rules of ritual assert or imply the impermissibility of postmortem removal
of organs/tissues from its members. The circumstance of such objectors
would be analogous to those who for religious reasons objected to bearing
arms during the era of military conscription. The burden of proof would
be borne by those who claim religious reasons for nonconsent, yet desire
to be eligible to receive organs/tissues on a first-priority basis along with
consenters. Presenting evidence for a religious exception to the organ
allocation priority rule should be no more onerous than presenting evi-
dence for the status of conscientious objector to bearing arms in combat.
Requiring that the burden be met is reasonable and can be salutary.
Individuals who think that consenting to provide their own organs/tissues
after death is inconsistent with their religious beliefs will be required to
examine this view under pressure of the principal ethical claim justifying
the revised distribution policy itself, namely, that consenting is a moral
duty. It is expected that the critical examination of those beliefs that
supposedly preclude consent will be conducted among authorities within
religious organizations and in consultations of lay persons with such
authorities. It is plausible to believe that the result of such critical re-
flection will be the recognition that the supposed inconsistency between
I Gapen, supra note 73.89Rosner, supra note 74; see also Dukeminier & Sanders, Organ Transplan-
tation: A Proposal for Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 413, 416 (1968).
1 Pittsburgh Transplant Foundation, Postmortem Organ Procurement Protocol
(1984).
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religious beliefs and the act of consenting is ill-founded. People may even
discover that their religious beliefs positively require giving such con-
sent.9'
IV. SUMMARY
The practices of donor recruitment and organ procurement and dis-
tribution in the United States are currently informed by two significant
but nonetheless mistaken assumptions. The first incorrect assumption,
typically embraced by organ procurement personnel, is that a validly
signed donor card functions merely as a nonbinding expression of the
signer's willingness to have usable organs removed from his or her body
after death. The second fallacious assumption, discernible in standard
donor recruitment appeals, is that consenting to the posthumous taking
of one's own organs is an act of charity, not a matter of moral duty. This
Article has presented ample evidence to show the falsity of each of these
assumptions.
An alternative, theoretically unified policy was proposed to govern
the distinguishable activities of consenter recruitment, organ procure-
ment, and distribution; this proposed policy is consistent with the correct
assumptions on the issues cited. Under the revised policy, consenter. re-
cruitment messages would inform the public that consenting is a moral
duty, an instance of the more general moral duty to assist an endangered
individual (or individuals) when this can be done at minimal or zero cost/
risk to self. Organ distribution would proceed on the principle that, under
conditions of scarcity, those who have given prior consent to the post-
humous taking of their own organs shall have first-priority access to the
cadaver organ pool in the event of need.
Various special problems connected with operationalizing the pro-
posed system were considered and strategies suggested for addressing
them. Throughout, reasons were offered for believing that the revised
approach is politically feasible and hence merits serious consideration by
law- and policy-makers.
V. APPENDIX
A. A Revised Approach for Counseling Families of Deceased
Declared Organ "Donors"
Section L.A of the present Article sought to demonstrate that asking
the family of a deceased declared donor for permission to remove body
parts from such an individual is a violation of both the spirit and the
letter of the UAGA. The correct approach is simply to inform the family
that appropriate procedures will be initiated to make the decedent's or-
gans available for those lifesaving purposes he or she previously endorsed.
" See May, Religious Justifications for Donating Body Parts, 15 HASTINGS CEN-
TER REP. 38 (1985).
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The conclusion of Section 1.B was that, for a typically situated individual,
consenting to the posthumous taking of his or her own organs is not an
act of charity, but rather the fulfillment of the general moral duty to
assist persons in peril when this can be done at zero or minimal cost or
risk to a potential rescuer. Characterizing such consent as an act of kind-
ness lying beyond the call of moral duty is therefore unjustified.
If these two conclusions are accepted, then the substance of what
organ procurement personnel say to the family of a deceased consenter
will have to be revised accordingly. Procurement staff must avoid leading
such a family to believe that they (the family) have a legal responsibility
to validate the prior decision of their deceased loved one to serve as
posthumous provider of organs. Otherwise, the family is given the im-
pression that they have a legal or moral right to veto the prior author-
ization of their relative to have useful organs removed from his or her
body after death. Beyond this, a deceased person's agreement to serve as
a posthumous organ provider must not be characterized as a work of
supererogation. Given the analysis presented in 1.B., providing such con-
sent is the fulfillment of the general moral duty of mutual aid. The lan-
guage of charity is neither appropriate nor necessary. As Kant has taught
us, a person is hardly demeaned by doing his or her duty out of respect
for duty. Kant says of such a good will that it "sparkles like a jewel in
its own right. '92 Procurement staff should therefore have no misgivings
about speaking of a decedent's antemortem consent as a response to a
moral duty incumbent upon us all.
Now it must be recognized that if the approach to families of deceased
declared consenters is revised in the manner indicated, psychological
problems for the survivors may be exacerbated. Substantial evidence
exists that families of deceased potential donors who have been asked
about and who have consented to organ recovery from brain dead relatives
derive significant therapeutic value from this action. Being offered the
opportunity to authorize organ retrieval from loved ones provides families
with a sense of being able to do something to bring some good out of the
senseless deaths with which they are trying to cope. 93 Moreover, it is also
reasonable to assume that most survivors of declared consenters have
probably heard or read about families who have donated organs from
deceased kin. Hence, there is reason to expect that if the physician, nurse,
or transplant coordinator approaches the family of a declared consenter
and simply informs them about what the hospital will be doing to give
effect to their loved one's wishes to serve as a posthumous organ provider
- rather than asking the family's permission to do this - the family
may find this approach both unorthodox and stress-increasing. The ap-
proach directly challenges an important (though incorrect) assumption
shared by most families in this type of situation, namely, that at least
until interment or cremation, they have legitimate and final authority
concerning the disposition of the body "of their loved one. The challenge
921 . KANT, supra note 82.
93 Batten & Prottas, Kind Strangers: The Families of Organ Donors, 6 HEALTH
AFF. 35, 37-38, 44-45 (1987).
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may itself intensify the family's distress. In addition, telling the family,
rather than asking them about what will be done with the decedent's
body parts, deprives the family of those therapeutic benefits just men-
tioned which are typically gained by families who are asked to consent
to organ recovery from their loved ones and who authorize this procedure.
In the view of the present writer, however, the value of protecting
the decedent's right to control the disposition of his or her body after
death and the value of saving lives threatened by ESODs take precedence
over protecting the psychic welfare of dissenting families when these
values are in irresolvable conflict. Though this rank ordering of the com-
peting values is justified in this author's judgment, we must still consider
how an organ procurement staffperson should proceed in informing the
family of a declared consenter concerning what the hospital will be doing
to give effect to the decedent's express desire to have his or her organs
made available to needy others after death. We need, in other words, to
develop a protocol for approaching families of declared consenters that is
sensitive to the needs of these families, but which at the same time openly
and forthrightly acknowledges and protects the important values of pre-
serving donors' control over the disposition of their bodies and saving the
lives of transplant candidates. To be adequate, any proposed protocol must
be informed by and responsive to a number of problems typically con-
nected with counseling survivors in this type of circumstance.
First, from a medical standpoint, the most acceptable donors are usu-
ally young, otherwise healthy individuals who suffer some type of fatal
head trauma (e.g., an aneurism). The vital organs of these brain dead
individuals usually remain unaffected by the cerebral insult, and heart-
beat and respiration can be maintained artificially through the use of
respirators and other critical care devices. While these victims are dead
according to conservative and accepted medical and legal criteria, i.e.,
while they are unequivocally "cadavers," they do not appear dead to either
professional medical staff or laypersons.
[T]hey remind us in many ways of living patients. They are
warm and retain a healthy color, which is no surprise, because
their hearts continue to pump oxygenated blood throughout
their bodies. Digestion, metabolism, and elimination continue
... [T]hese dead patients do not appear to be very different
from ... usual patients, who are under general anesthesia. '94
Convincing the decedent's family that their loved one is dead, visual
appearances notwithstanding, is an additional special hurdle that must
be overcome in the unique circumstance of organ retrieval here under
consideration. In cases of unexpected deaths generally, getting the family
to accept the fact that their relative has indeed died is difficult enough
because the unprepared survivors are in a state of acute distress, typically
harbor a sense of unreality, and frequently hold to the possibility that
their loved one might still be alive. 95 The seemingly healthy appearance
Organ Retrieval, supra note 34, at 321-22.
9, Miles, supra note 34, at 154.
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of artifically maintained cadavers thus complicates further the task of
persuading the family that their relative is in fact dead.
Second, some of the survivors may view the process of organ recovery
as itself a disrespectful manner of treating the dead.9 6 Also, family mem-
bers may believe that organ removal from the deceased will preclude, or
negatively affect, the possibility or quality of the afterlife for their loved
one.9 7 Mindful of these considerations, the following guidelines are pro-
posed for informing families of deceased declared donors of the death of
these individuals and of the process of organ recovery that medical staff
will be initiating in deference to the decedent's stated desires to serve as
a posthumous organ provider.
B. Protocol Recommendations
1. An appropriate physical setting should be located. Ideally it should
be informal, quiet, and private.98
2. If the attending physician is to inform the family of their relative's
death, then ideally he or she should be accompanied by a nurse to
whom the family feels close.99
3. Once the family is seated, the physician should announce death
briefly and straightforwardly. Equivocation in informing of death,
perhaps to soften the blow, is both dishonest and counterproductive
since it may contribute to the family's maintaining false hopes for a
miraculous recovery.100
[E]uphemism and ambiguity confuse families, whose compre-
hension often suffers in such stressful situations. 'Preparing'
the expectant listeners with a narrative only torments them.
A straightforward 'Mrs. Brown, I'm sorry to tell you that your
husband has died' conveys fact and sympathy. Once death has
been disclosed, time can be taken to review the illness and
mode of death. Silence helps some families most of all. The
physician should include any personal recollections - ideally
nonmedical - of the patient while talking with the family. An-
ecdotes embodying concern for the patient's comfort may be
consoling. The physician should offer support with statements
such as 'He died without pain,' 'She will not suffer any more,'
or 'I spoke with the nurse who was with her and .... ' Precise
wording makes little difference; family members clearly per-
ceive honesty and kindness - or lack of concern, for that mat-
ter.01
Organ Retrieval, supra note 34, at 321-32.
91 See Gapen, supra note 73.98 Perkins, The Shortage of Cadaver Organs for Transplantation: Can Psy-
chology Help?, 42 AM. PSYCH. 921, 925-26 (1987); Schneiderman & Gruhn, How
- and Why - to Request an Autopsy, 77 POSTGRAD. MED. 153, 156 (1985).
Schneiderman & Gruhn, supra note 98, at 156.
100 Perkins, supra note 98, at 925.
101 Schneiderman & Gruhn, supra note 98, at 156.
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4. The physician or other appropriate staffperson must explain the con-
cept of brain death and convey to the family that neurologic death
is a terminal event; hence, nothing more can be done for the patient. °2
5. Time should be allotted for the family to absorb the announcement
of death and to assimilate the unfamiliar notion of brain death. Some
families grasp this idea quickly, others may take hours, or overnight.
The family will probably want to see the (artifically maintained) body
of their loved one during this period. This should be permitted.
6. When the person who is to inform the family about organ retrieval
from their loved one judges that sufficient time has elapsed for the
family to ponder and accept the difficult announcement of death, the
person should approach the family realizing that the information he
or she is about to convey will make it unequivocally clear that there
is no basis for continuing hope for a miraculous recovery. The follow-
ing is an example of the manner in which the needed information
might be communicated to a family in this circumstance:
Mrs. Jones (or the Jones family), I know that this is an ex-
traordinarily difficult time for you. As I indicated earlier, we
did everything we could for John. I want, however, to relay
some information which I hope may bring some measure of
consolation to you. Are you aware that in October, 1985, John
signed what is called an "organ donor card?" While he was
alive, did he ever speak with you about his desire to have his
organs made available after death to help save the lives of
those waiting to receive transplants? John obviously was a
person of moral sensitivity who had a clear perception of a
responsibility resting upon us all, namely, to help, where con-
venient and possible, those whose health and very lives are in
serious jeopardy. John's recognizing and responding to this ob-
ligation, like the famous Good Samaritan, expresses the best
of which any of us are capable. His formally completing a legal
donor card is a model for us all. I trust, then, that you will be
pleased to learn that this hospital, honoring John's wishes, will
shortly begin the process of making John's organs available
for transfer to needy individuals some of whom may be saved
from death itself by receiving them.
7. The person speaking with the family should hasten to clarify that
the required surgery will in no way delay or complicate funeral ar-
rangements, and that the decedent's body will show no scars or dis-
figurement should it lie in state. If the family asks about which organs
are to be taken, and the staffperson has information about this mat-
ter, he or she should disclose it.
102 Weber, The Human Connection: The Role of the Nurse in Organ Donation,
17 J. NEUROSURG. NuRs. 119, 121 (1985).
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8. Should the family express concern that organ removal from their
loved one might jeopardize the possibility or quality of the afterlife
for the deceased, the following type of reply used by Howard Uni-
versity surgeon Clive Callendar in such situations should in most
cases be both appropriate and persuasive: "If God is capable of getting
you together, it doesn't matter whether there's almost nothing left
or not. If He's going to create the resurrection miracle, He doesn't
need your kidneys [or heart, liver, or pancreas, etc.] to do it.' 10 3
9. The staffperson should also tell the family that following organ re-
trieval they will have an opportunity to see their loved one again
before his or her body is released from the hospital for funeral pro-
ceedings. It has been found that "when such an opportunity has been
offered, families have chosen it without hesitation."'10 4 Family mem-
bers will then be able "to see their loved one after the organs have
been taken, the machines have been disconnected, all life functions
have ceased, and the loved one seems at peace. The body of the de-
ceased can be appropriately cleaned and covered. Such an arrange-
ment allows for a more traditional farewell and could take place in
the recovery room or in an unoccupied operating room."'0 5
10. The staffperson should also tell the family that he or she will contact
them as soon as information is available concerning the types of
individuals who have become recipients of their loved one's organs.
The organ procurement agency involved typically makes such general
information available to the notifying hospital, though the names of
recipients and other highly specific information concerning their cir-
cumstances are sometimes withheld.
The preceding protocol is consistent with the recommendations made
in Parts I and II of this essay. It avoids possible family veto of the stated
antemortem consent of the deceased to be a posthumous provider of needed
organs. Also, it does not falsely characterize such consent as an act of
charity but rather as the fulfillment of a basic moral obligation to assist
our vulnerable and helpless brethren in circumstances where such aid
can be provided at zero or minimal cost/risk to self. In addition, the
protocol remains sensitive to the psychological needs of the grieving fam-
ily without jeopardizing the paramount values of protecting the declared
consenter's right to control the posthumous disposition of his or her body
and the saving of human lives through organ transplantation.
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